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This paper examines the implications of restricting the tradability of carbon rights in the 
presence of induced technical change. Unlike earlier approaches aiming at exploring the 
tradability-technology linkage we focus on climate-relevant 'carbon-saving' technical change. 
This is achieved by incorporating endogenous investment in carbon productivity into the 
RICE-99 integrated assessment model of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). Simulation analysis of 
various emission reduction scenarios with several restrictions on emissions trading reveals a 
pronounced dichotomy of effects across regions: Restrictions to trading raise the investments 
in carbon productivity in permit demanding regions while reducing them in permit supplying 
regions. In terms of per capita consumption, permit demanding regions lose and permit 
supplying regions gain from restrictions. In scenarios that involve 'hot air', restrictions to trade 
lower overall emissions which results in reduced climate damage for most regions. Reduced 
damage, in turn, reduces the incentive to invest in carbon productivity. 
 
Keywords: carbon-saving technological progress, emissions trading, flexibility mechanism, 
induced technological change, integrated assessment model 
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Climate change due to anthropogenic carbon emissions has been a source of growing concern 
within the last decades. In environmental-economic research a great deal of effort has been 
devoted to estimating the costs and benefits of carbon abatement policies (IPCC 2001). In 
addition, the search for strategies to reach carbon abatement targets in a cost-effective manner 
has been an important research topic and a hot issue in international climate negotiations. 
 
With respect to cost-effectiveness, an important feature of carbon abatement is that it 
represents a purely global common. That is, it does not matter where abatement takes place. 
In such circumstances, standard economic reasoning suggests that overall costs are minimized 
when abatement is allocated among parties in such a way as to equalize marginal abatement 
costs. Such an allocation can be sustained by market-based mechanisms. Hence, the 
conclusion is that market-based instruments indeed lower the total cost of achieving a given 
overall abatement target, by enhancing an equalization of marginal abatement costs across 
parties. 
 
This line of reasoning has played a key role in international climate diplomacy. A major 
outcome of the climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the Kyoto Protocol (KP). For the first time in history, a group 
of signatory countries, the so-called Annex B countries of the KP, obligated themselves to 
quantitative emission limits
1. An important ingredient to the KP is the introduction of so-
called flexibility mechanisms. The most far-reaching of these mechanisms is emissions 
trading (ET). Under ET each country may choose either to reduce emissions to comply with 
its emission limit or to buy additional permits. Likewise, each country can reduce more than 
necessary and sell permits. The fundamental constraint is that the overall emission limit of all 
trading parties be satisfied. This enables the (industrialized) countries to reduce carbon 
emissions where and how it is cheapest
2. 
 
In spite of their presumed benefits, the flexible Kyoto mechanisms are much debated. One 
argument is that they prevent countries from investing in technological progress. Placing 
                                                 
1 Annex B countries comprise mainly western industrialized countries and the countries in transition in Eastern 
and Central Europe 
  2restrictions on flexibility may in this view imply long-term benefits due to induced 
technological change (see eg. Hourcade and LePesant 2000, Grubb, Brack and Vrolijk 1999, 
Oberthür and Ott 1999). In the political arena, this and related reasoning has motivated 
demands that ceilings should be imposed on the degree to which emissions are tradable. 
 
This paper examines the implications of ceilings on emissions trading in climate policy when 
there is induced carbon-saving technical change. To that purpose we extend the well-known 
RICE-99 integrated assessment model of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) by endogenizing 
'decarbonization' hitherto included in RICE-99 in an exogenous fashion. More specifically, 
we introduce into the model a stock of knowledge, being the result of cumulative R&D 
spending, which raises the productivity of carbon energy in terms of the energy services that 
can be derived from it. The model extended in this way is used to simulate several variants of 
carbon abatement scenarios considered in the previous literature. These abatement scenarios 
are combined with different assumptions on the admissible degree of emissions trading. 
 
There have been earlier approaches at endogenizing technological progress in economic 
models of climate change
3, but only few attempts to analyze the linkage between the 
flexibility mechanisms and induced technological change. To our knowledge only Buonanno 
et al. (2001) have so far analyzed restrictions to emissions trading in the presence of induced 
technological progress, using an earlier vintage of the RICE model as the basis for modeling 
technological change. In that version of RICE (see Nordhaus and Yang 1996), energy is not 
portrayed explicitly, neither as a production input nor as a source of carbon emissions. Rather, 
there is a 'reduced form' representation of production and emissions, the latter being 
proportional to output. In the Buonanno et al. (2001) extension an endogenous knowledge 
stock is introduced which serves the twin purpose of raising total factor productivity, thus 
enhancing output, and reducing the emission-output ratio. The effect of this type of 
technological progress on emissions is ambiguous a priori. 
 
Using RICE-99 as the basis for our modeling work allows us to focus on that category of 
technological progress - decarbonization - which is most likely to respond to the rationing of 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 Other mechanisms are Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism. Joint implementation 
allows industrialized countries to reduce emissions via investment in other industrialized countries. The clean 
development mechanism is similar but allows investors to claim credit for reductions in developing countries. 
3 See Weyant and Olavson (1999) and Löschel (2002) for overviews. More recent examples are Buonanno et al. 
(2003) and Popp (2003). 
  3carbon emissions.
4 Using this approach we find a pronounced dichotomy of effects across 
regions: Restrictions to trading raise the investments in carbon productivity in permit 
demanding regions while reducing them in permit supplying regions. In terms of per capita 
consumption, permit demanding regions lose and permit supplying regions gain from 
restrictions. In scenarios that involve 'hot air', trade restrictions lower overall emissions which 
results in reduced climate damage for most regions. Reduced damage, in turn, reduces the 
incentive to invest in carbon productivity. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we highlight the role of induced technological 
change in carbon abatement policy and its interplay with emissions trading. Section 3 is 
dedicated to our modeling approach. In section 4, we introduce the scenarios examined and 
present and discuss our simulation results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2  Emissions Trading and Induced Technological Change 
2.1. Conceptual  Background 
 
Standard economic reasoning suggests that emissions trading minimizes the cost of carbon 
abatement by equalizing differentials in marginal abatement cost. This line of thought has 
largely attracted policy makers in international climate negotiations especially from 
industrialized countries and has entered the Kyoto-Protocol as the well-known flexibility 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, the attractiveness of these mechanisms has been called into 
question for several reasons. One line of reasoning maintains that the possibility of buying 
emission permits from abroad instead of domestic abatement reduces the incentives for 
environmental friendly innovation and the development of low carbon technologies (see eg. 
Hourcade and LePesant 2000, Grubb, Brack and Vrolijk 1999, Oberthür and Ott 1999). The 
converse of this view implies that placing restrictions on emissions trading is beneficial in the 
long term since it stimulates the creation of technologies which provide the opportunity to 
lessen the (negative) environmental impacts of economic growth or, likewise, make higher 
economic activity levels sustainable in the presence of binding environmental constraints.  
 
The responsiveness of technological progress to economic incentives - on which these 
arguments rely - has long been acknowledged in economic research and come to be known as 
                                                 
4 Another difference between our work and that of Buonanno et al. (2000) is that we consider a finer regional 
  4'induced innovation hypothesis'. The basic idea is that technological progress is the result of 
R&D activities that are costly and ultimately emerge as “ …an endogenous equilibrium 
response to Schumpeterian profit incentives” as Jaffe et al. (2000, p. 20) put it.
5 One robust 
feature of these models is the presence of scale effects. This means that the incentives to 
engage in R&D as well as the resulting level of technological progress are an increasing 
function of the size of the market in which the new technology can be applied. 
 
Within the broad field of induced innovation, it is convenient to distinguish two lines of 
research. One focuses on the determinants of total factor productivity which were kept 
unexplained in neoclassical growth theory. Endogenous growth theory (Aghion and Howitt 
1998) tackled this issue by endogenizing technological change. It is characteristic of this 
literature that those production inputs which ultimately lead to environmental emissions - 
especially energy - are usually not considered. Consequently, the environmental consequences 
of this kind of technological progress (total factor productivity improvement) remain unclear. 
 
While this literature is concerned with 'undirected' technological change, what seems more 
relevant to the subject of this paper is technological change specifically directed towards 
environmentally relevant inputs. This issue is akin to the theory of 'induced bias in 
innovation', a branch of research initiated two decades earlier than endogenous growth theory 
which relates to the question how the specific productivity of a particular factor of production 
evolves in response to economic conditions. The basic prediction from this literature (see 
Stoneman 1983) is that - unless factors are highly substitutable - an increase in the relative 
price of one factor triggers technological change such that the productivity of this factor 
increases, a phenomenon referred to as induced factor-saving technological change.
6  
 
To the extent that restrictions to permit trading make carbon use more expensive, it is 
consistent with the results from this literature that trade restrictions may stimulate carbon 
saving technological change. This reasoning will apply to potential buyers of carbon permits. 
On the other hand, however, suppliers of permits will also engage in carbon-saving R&D, and 
they will do the more so the larger is the permit market. Indeed, carbon-saving technological 
                                                                                                                                                          
disaggregation (13 world regions instead of 6) and a greater variety of abatement scenarios. 
5 Investment in R&D is one among other possible ways (such as R&D spillovers or technological learning) to 
endogenize innovation (see, e.g., Löschel 2002).  
6 The distinction between total factor productivity and factor-specific productivity provides a useful framework 
for our approach at endogenizing technological change (see section 3.2). It does not imply that factor-specific 
technological change is necessarily irrelevant for growth. 
  5change makes more carbon permits abundant in the supplier countries, so they can be sold in 
the market. In this sense, the possibility to sell additional permits acts as an incentive to 
undertake carbon-saving R&D, and these incentives increase in the size of the market (scale 
effect). Conversely, restricting the tradability of permits reduces R&D incentives in these 
countries. 
 
It is thus not to be expected that trade restrictions universally trigger carbon-saving R&D. 
Moreover, even if induced R&D rises, given restricted possibilities of buying permits, it is not 
clear whether a country taking resort to increased R&D might not be better off on balance if 
trade restrictions were removed and 'forced' R&D expenditures were saved. These are rather 
complicated questions that cannot be resolved a priory. Rather, they need careful empirical 
modeling of the issue. 
 
2.2.  The Policy Context 
 
In addition to the general logic just outlined, a further aspect is introduced by the 
particularities of the abatement targets as laid down in the KP. The Kyoto commitments are 
calculated with respect to the emission levels of 1990. This was just before the collapse of 
emissions in the former Soviet Union in the aftermath of transition. As a result of this 
collapse, the former Soviet Union is endowed with a huge amount of abundant emission 
rights. 
 
The implications of this circumstance vary sharply with the admissible extent of emissions 
trading. Under full ET, abundant permits would in their entirety represent emission reduction 
credits accessible to all other countries. As a result, no abatement action would be required at 
all for a considerable period of time in order to satisfy the overall Kyoto commitment (Grubb 
et al. 2001). The western industrialized countries – which are the main polluters – could 
simply buy cheap emission reduction credits, a phenomenon known as trade in ‘hot air'. 
 
With respect to induced technological change, the possibility of 'hot air' trade would likely 
remove significant portions of the incentive to engage in carbon-saving R&D beyond 
business-as usual levels. This effect has further intensified since the US’ recession from the 
KP because only the US demand for permits could have bid up the permit price sufficiently to 
act as an incentive for R&D. 
 
  6In a more long-term perspective, neither the Kyoto targets nor the withdrawal of the US may 
be the 'last word'. Scientific evidence demands for much higher emission reductions than the 
Kyoto targets. Consequently, the KP should be regarded only as a first step in a process of 
sequential (yet unknown) commitments towards more ambitious emission reduction in the 
future. With more ambitious abatement targets the incentives for carbon-saving R&D will rise 
even under full ET. 
 
To explore these issues we will examine not only a scenario involving the Kyoto abatement 
targets (Kyoto Forever) but also one in which the Kyoto targets become stricter over time 
(Kyoto Dynamic). In addition, a scenario will be considered in which abatement targets are 




3 The  Model 
3.1.  Basic Framework and Previous Modeling of Endogenous Technical Change 
 
We use the well-known RICE model of integrated assessment as our basic modeling 
framework and extend it by endogenizing technological change. Unlike Buonanno et al. 
(2001) we employ an updated version, referred to as RICE-99 (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000), 
which incorporates an explicit treatment of the linkage between carbon energy, the energy 
services that can be derived from it, and the resulting carbon emissions. 
 
The RICE model is a multi-region single sector optimal growth model, coupled with a simple 
representation of the carbon cycle.
8 Within each region, the optimal paths of fixed investment 
and emission abatement are chosen that maximize the present value of consumption-based 
utility. Population (taken to be equal to full employment) and technology levels grow over 
time in an exogenous fashion. Atmospheric carbon levels are fed by carbon emissions and 
feed back on production possibilities, thus driving a wedge between output gross and net of 
climate change effects. 
 
                                                 
7 The choice of these scenarios is partly inspired by the scenarios examined in the Energy Modeling Forum (see 
Weyant and Hill 1999, pp. xiii-xiv). 
8 See Appendix 1 for a general description. 
  7Notwithstanding these general characteristics, several vintages of the RICE model exist which 
differ in terms of a number of features. The differences most relevant for the present paper 
concern the specification of the production process, the emission function, and the number of 
world regions.
9 We first provide a brief discussion of RICE-96 (Nordhaus and Yang 1996) 
and how it was extended by Buonanno et al. (2001) to account for endogenous technological 
change. The next section will be devoted to our extension of RICE-99.  
 
RICE-96 features six regions (US, Japan, Europe, China, Former Soviet Union, Rest of the 
World). Output is produced according to a constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology in 
capital and labor with exogenous total factor productivity and used for investment and 
consumption. Carbon emissions are proportional to output, where the emission-output ratio is 
variable, due to abatement activities. The latter imply a deduction from output. 
 
These relations form the basis for the technical change extension performed by Buonanno et 
al. (2001). Their approach is to introduce a stock of knowledge KR which represents the level 
of technology and which evolves endogenously as a result of R&D expenditures. In 
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In this formulation j refers to the model regions and t to time periods (of 10 years length). In 
equation (1) Q is output net of climate change effects and emission abatement. K and L 
denote capital and labor, respectively, and A is total factor productivity. Net output takes into 
account the (mostly negative) feedback of the climate system by the climate damage 
coefficient (Ω) and total abatement cost that depend on the abatement cost parameter (b) and 
the emission control rate (µ) that is the policy variable. According to equation (2) emissions 
depend on gross output, the emissions control rate, and the carbon intensity of production 
represented by the term σ+χ⋅exp(-αKR). 
 
                                                 
9 Other differences relate to the treatment of energy supply and the specification of the climate module (see 
Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). 
  8This specification is an extension of the formulation of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) in the 
sense that the latter can be recovered from the former by setting the production elasticity of 
knowledge β and the scaling coefficient χ equal to zero. With β and χ strictly positive, a 
growing level of knowledge KR serves two purposes: it increases total factor productivity and 
decreases carbon intensity of output. This approach is justified by Buonanno et al. (2001) by 
pointing to the difficulty of specifying and calibrating a model with different types of R&D.  
 
3.2.  Carbon-Saving Technological Change 
 
A limitation of the RICE-96 model and its extension is the reduced-form representation of the 
production structure and emission function. RICE-99 provides a respecification of these 
relationships, designed to explicitly capture 'carbon energy' in its twin role as a production 
input and source of emissions. This reformulation is useful since it permits to incorporate the 
concept of carbon-saving technological change. In RICE-99 as described in Nordhaus and 
Boyer (2000), carbon-saving technological change is exogenous. Consistent with the theory 
of induced bias in innovation discussed in section 2.1, it is carbon-saving technological 
change that is most likely to respond to limitations to carbon use. It is this response that we 
aim to model. 
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In this formulation a new input called energy services (ES) enters the production function (3). 
Since energy services are a produced input, the term c
E⋅ES in equation (3) subtracts from 
gross output the costs of producing this input. As specified in equation (4), energy services 
are derived from fossil fuel consumption (E). Fossil fuel consumption is equal to the carbon 
content of fossil fuels, that is fossil energy is lumped into a single aggregate where the 
different fuels are aggregated using carbon weights. Fossil energy use can be identified with 
(energy-related) carbon emissions.
10 
                                                 
10 For convenience, both are measured in carbon units. 
  9 
Technological change takes two forms: economy-wide technological change (change of total 
factor productivity, A) and carbon-saving technological change. Economy-wide technological 
change is Hicks-neutral, while carbon-saving technological change is modeled as reducing the 
ratio of CO2 emissions to energy services or, equivalently, raising energy efficiency ς = ES/E 
(whose base-year value is normalized to one, see equation (5)). Because of carbon saving 
technological change, society is able to squeeze more energy services per unit of carbon 
energy.  
 
In RICE-99 both A and ς are projected exogenously into the future. Since the share of carbon 
energy in gross output is small restrictions to carbon energy use will mainly affect ς. 
Therefore, we retain the exogeneity assumption with respect to total factor productivity. 
Carbon-saving technological change, however, is endogenized to reflect that economic agents 
will invest in energy-related knowledge to raise fossil energy efficiency when carbon use is 
restricted. 
 
The idea of induced energy efficiency improvement (or likewise carbon-saving technological 
change) is captured by introducing a new variable, energy-related knowledge (KE). Its 




















As can be seen from equation (6), the index of energy efficiency ς is an iso-elastic function of 
the stock of knowledge relative to the benchmark period. This formulation ensures that the 




The energy-related knowledge stock evolves in the following way: 
 
   (7)  ,, 1 ,, ,, (1 ) Ej t Ej t Ej t KK δ + =− + I
                                                 
11 It may be noted that upon inserting (6) in (4) and the result in (3) one obtains a production function for gross 
output with inputs capital, labor, energy-related knowledge, and carbon energy which exhibits increasing returns 
to scale.  
  10 
Energy-related knowledge thus accumulates according to the perpetual inventory model. 
Knowledge can be accumulated through investments (IE) and the stock is subject to 
depreciation according to the depreciation rate δ (=5%). 
 
Now the economic agents have an additional strategic variable to lower emissions: instead of 
substituting physical capital for energy or lowering production they can lower emissions by 
investing in energy knowledge via R&D. However, scarce resources have to be devoted to 
this purpose that compete with investments in physical capital (I) and consumption (C). The 
macroeconomic expenditure constraint thus reads:
12 
 
  ,, , , jt jt jt E jt QCII , = ++  (8) 
 
Overall, in RICE-99 extended to account for induced energy efficiency improvements, output 
(net of energy costs and climate change effects) is allocated to consumption and two types of 
investment. This is achieved in an inter-temporal forward-looking manner, the objective 
function being the present value of discounted utility. 
 
3.3 Emissions Trading and Technical Change 
 
Emissions Trading (ET) is introduced via the imposition of emission constraints or targets on 
regions and grouping them in a so-called trading bloc.
13 Emissions trading requires to modify 
the regional expenditure constraints to account for purchases or sales of emission permits: 
 
   (9)  ,, ,, , jt jt jt K ejt t jt QCII p P D =+ + + ,
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where p denotes the permit price. PD denotes permit demand and is defined as actual 
emissions E less the assigned amounts E  that are allocated to the respective regions in the 
various abatement scenarios. Clearly, PD and the resulting flow of funds p⋅PD can be positive 
or negative, depending on whether a region is a permit buyer or a permit seller. The sum of 
                                                 
12 Note that the RICE model does not feature international trade, except for trade in carbon permits (see below).  
13 Two trading blocs will be considered in our simulations: The Annex B countries, and the entire world.  
  11permit demands within a trading bloc is required to be non-positive, i.e. the total emissions 
within a trading bloc must not exceed the emissions which the bloc is entitled to. The permit 
price is the dual or shadow value associated with this constraint.  
 
Restrictions on ET are modeled by placing a trading quota on a region's abatement 
requirement. The quota is exogenously set between zero and unity and determines the 
maximum amount of ET allowed with respect to domestic action. 
 
   (11) 
_




In principle, it may be the case that a quota is not binding, i.e. the endogenously determined 
amount of trade falls short of the maximum trade volume allowed. 
 
3.4 Empirical Implementation 
 
The RICE-99 model of integrated assessment features the 13 world regions listed in Table 1. 
The model is solved in time steps of 10 years, the base-year being 1994. The time horizon is 
200 years. 
 




EE (Eastern Europe)  Africa 
EUR (OECD Europe)   China  
Japan  HIO (High Income OPEC)  
OHI (Other High Income Countries)  India 
Russia   LI (Low Income Countries) 
USA   LMI (Lower & Middle Income Countries) 
  MI (Middle Income Countries) 
 
The model regions differ not only with respect to their economic characteristics but also with 
respect to their vulnerability to climate change. Even though most regions are in general 
negatively affected by climate change, some regions may benefit from small degrees of global 
warming. Both the economic and climate-related characteristics of the regions are reflected in 
the calibration of the model. Moreover, the dynamic evolution of the model regions under 
business-as-usual (BAU) assumptions (that is, without limits to carbon emissions) is driven 
  12by projections concerning population and rates of technological change. With respect to the 
data and calibration of the basic model, the reader is referred to Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). 
 
In implementing our model extension, the basic data and projections of RICE-99 are retained 
as far as possible. In addition, data for investment in energy efficiency from IEA (1997) are 
used to construct benchmark data for IE (as appearing in equation (8)) and KE (as appearing in 
equation (6)).
14 Given the augmented data set, it is possible to calibrate the extended model. 
 
In our calibration we wish to benefit from the expertise devoted by Nordhaus and Boyer 
(2000) to the design of their BAU scenario. That is we want to reproduce the BAU 
trajectories of emissions as well as GDP and its uses (consumption and investment in physical 
capital). Our approach is to calibrate the elasticity of energy efficiency with respect to energy-
related knowledge, ε, in such a way that the exogenous projection of carbon-saving 
technological change (ς) is met. In general, the parameters resulting from this procedure lie 
between zero and unity, meaning that there is a concave relationship between the level of KE 
and energy productivity.
15 In addition, total factor productivity (A) is adjusted to 
accommodate the modified expenditure constraint (equation (8)). 
 
It should be noted that our calibration of endogenous carbon-augmenting technical change 
leaves net output (GDP) unaffected. In this regard, we follow Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), 
who are careful in avoiding output-enhancing effects of increased carbon productivity.  
 
4  Scenarios and Results 
4.1 Description of Scenarios 
 
We consider three abatement scenarios which are variants of scenarios previously considered 
in the literature (see Weyant and Hill 1999, pp. xiii-xiv): (a) Kyoto Forever (KyEv), (b) Kyoto 
Dynamic (KyDyn) and (c) a scenario that restricts atmospheric concentration of carbon to 
500ppm. All cases are run with four different degrees (100%, 75%, 50% and 25%) of 
emissions trading (ET). Therefore, apart from the BAU-scenario, we arrive at 12 scenarios 
(see Table 2). 
 
                                                 
14 See Appendix 2 on the procedure and results. 
  13All cases have in common that they start with the Annex B emission targets and ET within the 
Annex B-bloc without the US in 2014. That is, they start with the ‘Bonn-Marrakech-
Accord’
16 (BMA). The first commitment period of the KP is 2008 – 2012. Due to the so-
called commitment reserve, parties are only allowed to sell a small fraction of their allowed 
emissions until the end of the commitment period (Woerdman 2002, p. 89). Therefore, actual 
ET is only expected to begin thereafter when the required reporting and monitoring procedure 
is completed. In line with this time frame, compliance and ET of Annex B (without the US) in 
all scenarios are assumed to start in 2014. A basic assumption of all scenarios is that the US 
will re-join the climate change community in the second commitment period. That is, the US 
will comply with their respective targets and join the trading bloc in 2024. 
 
Table 2: Scenarios 
Bau Business-as-usual 
KyEv100  Kyoto forever, 100% Annex B-ET  
KyEv75  Kyoto forever, 75% Annex B -ET 
KyEv50  Kyoto forever, 50% Annex B -ET 
KyEv25  Kyoto forever, 25% Annex B -ET 
KyDyn100  Kyoto dynamic, 5% reduct. Per decade, 100% Annex B -ET  
KyDyn75  Kyoto dynamic, 5% reduct. Per decade, 75% Annex B -ET 
KyDyn50  Kyoto dynamic, 5% reduct. Per decade, 50% Annex B -ET 
KyDyn25  Kyoto dynamic, 5% reduct. Per decade, 25% Annex B -ET 
500ppm100  Concentration target: 500 ppm, equal burden sharing, 100% global ET 
500ppm75  Concentration target: 500 ppm, equal burden sharing, 75% global ET 
500ppm50  Concentration target: 500 ppm, equal burden sharing, 50% global ET 
500ppm25  Concentration target: 500 ppm, equal burden sharing, 25% global ET 
 
 
In the Kyoto forever case (KyEv%), the Annex B regions (Japan, OECD Europe, OHI, Russia 
and Eastern Europe) have emission permits according to their Kyoto targets and start Annex 
B ET in 2014, i.e. in the first commitment period. These targets remain valid for the whole 
time horizon of the model. Similarly, in 2024 (the second commitment period) the US 
complies with their Kyoto target and joins ET as well for the rest of the time horizon. 
 
In the Kyoto dynamic case (KyDyn%), the permits of the Annex B regions (without the US) 
are reduced by 5% per decade with respect to their Kyoto targets, starting in the second 
commitment period. That is, in 2024, their target is 95% of the Kyoto emissions; in 2034, it is 
                                                                                                                                                          
15 This is in line with previous literature, see Goulder and Mathai (2000). 
16 The emission targets are calculated without any ‘loopholes’. That is, without any measures in land use, land 
use change and forestry (LULUCF) that might be counted as carbon credits. 
  1490% a. s. o. The US complies with the same dynamic commitment, lagging one decade 
behind. That is, in 2024, when the Annex B already reduce their targeted emissions by 5% 
with respect to the Kyoto target, the US are committed to their Kyoto target and start the same 
reductions thereafter. 
 
In the 500 ppm case (500ppm%), all remaining world regions (including the US) join the 
Annex B trading bloc in the second commitment period, thus creating worldwide ET. This 
case is characterized by equal burden sharing for all regions. That is, all world regions have to 
reduce their emissions by the same percentage from BAU emissions necessary to maintain the 
concentration target. The necessary percentage emission reduction is obtained from an earlier 
model run with an upper bound on the atmospheric concentration in the climate module. If the 
resulting emissions targets are higher than the Kyoto targets, the Annex B regions stick to 
their Kyoto commitment until the concentration target requires further reductions. The 
exception, again, is the US who is assumed not to be committed to the Kyoto targets but only 
to the emission limit derived from the concentration target subject to equal burden sharing. 
 
4.2 Basic Simulation Results 
 
In order to understand how restrictions to ET affect induced energy efficiency improvements 
it is useful to present some basic qualitative effects of imposing the various carbon abatement 
requirements under full emissions trading. These effects are compiled in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Basic Effects of Carbon Abatement under Full Emissions Trading 
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  15 
From column A it can be seen that the emission constraints under KyEv are not binding for 
Russia, EE, Japan and EUR. For Russia and EE this is true over the entire time horizon. For 
Japan and EUR, the constraints are binding initially but cease to be binding in 2034 due to 
these regions' high rates of carbon saving technological progress in the BAU case. Under 
KyDyn, only Russia and EE face non-binding constraints (over the entire horizon), whereas in 
the 500ppm case the constraints are binding in all regions and all periods except for Russia 
and EE in 2014.
17 
 
The three abatement scenarios are thus characterized by different degrees of strictness which 
imply different potentials for trade in 'hot air'. This is confirmed by column (B) which tells us 
that under KyEv between 84 and 100 percent of abatement duties are satisfied by buying 
permits. In the stricter KyDyn case the corresponding range is 43 to 92 percent, whereas the 
importance of ET in the 500ppm case is much smaller still (3 to 16 percent).
18  
 
The configuration of buyers and sellers of permits (columns C and D) is the same under KyEv 
and KyDyn: The US and OHI are buyers over the entire time horizon, whereas Russia and EE 
are sellers. EUR and Japan initially are buyers but switch their role from 2024 on. The 
500ppm scenario is different from these cases. It implies a variable buyer-seller configuration 
over time but, as mentioned above, the traded amounts are small. The variability of the buyer-
seller configuration indicates that the initial allocation of permits in this scenario ("equal 
burden sharing") is already close to a least-cost allocation, so small perturbations may turn a 
buyer into a seller or vice versa. 
 
Finally, column D tells us that in all scenarios only Russia, EE, and OHI will benefit from 
global warming - at least for some time - and will thus be hurt by lower global carbon levels. 




                                                 
17 The somewhat outstanding results for the year 2014 occurbecause of the model's set-up to run in 10 year time 
steps and therefore 2014 being thefirst trading opportunity with respect to the first commitment period. 
18 An interesting feature of the KyEv case is that the trading potential slightly rises over time, since Japan and 
Europe dispose of increasing amounts of abundant permits which they start selling from 2024 on (see column 
D). In the KyDyn case with its increasingly stricter abatement requirements the trading potential decreases over 
time. 
  164.3 Effects of Trade Restrictions  
 
As mentioned above, each abatement scenario is run with several degrees of constraints on 
emissions trading. We now present the effects of imposing abatement targets, combined with 
the constraints on the admissible degree of trading. All effects will be expressed as percentage 
changes relative to the BAU case. 
 
We first address the effects on carbon efficiency, see Table 4. Since the effects turned out to 
be nearly continuous in the degree of admissible trade, we restrict the presentation to the cases 
of 100 percent (full trade) and 50 percent. 
 
It is convenient to start the discussion with a comparison of the various abatement scenarios 
when trade is unrestricted. When we compare KyEv100 with KyDyn100, it is evident that 
from 2024 onwards the latter scenario implies substantially higher levels of carbon efficiency 
than the former in all of the Annex B regions. The reason is, of course, that the KyDyn case 
imposes stricter limits on emissions than KyEv. This effect is particularly pronounced in 
Japan and EUR, that is in the regions that are largely unconstrained under KyEv but face 
binding constraints under KyDyn. In Japan the level of energy efficiency in 2094 under 
KyDyn is almost twice the BAU level, whereas under KyEv it is only 6 percent above BAU. 
 
It should be noted that in 2014 - in contrast to later periods - all the Annex B buyer countries 
have lower carbon efficiency under KyDyn than under KyEv. KyDyn thus implies an inter-
temporal shift in R&D efforts: The value of decarbonization in the 'future' relative to that in 
the 'present' is higher under KyDyn than under KyEv, and R&D will be reallocated 
accordingly. 
 
The situation is different in non-Annex B regions (HIO, MI, LMI, LI, China, India, Africa). 
Here, carbon efficiency under KyDyn is below that under KyEv in all periods. The reason is 
that these regions benefit - via reduced climate-related damage - from the more aggressive 
reduction in carbon emissions undertaken by the Annex B regions under KyDyn; as a result 
these regions need to undertake less carbon-saving R&D.
19 This is a form of carbon leakage, 
this time related to a disincentive with respect to R&D. 
 
  17The 500ppm100 case is quite similar to the KyDyn100 case as far as the Annex B regions are 
concerned. With respect to the non-Annex B regions there is of course a huge difference, 
because they face abatement obligations in this scenario which they do not under KyDyn. As 
a result, their carbon efficiency is substantially higher now than under BAU (and under KyEv 
and KyDyn). The most pronounced efficiency improvement occurs in China, where the 
efficiency level in the second half of the century is about 24 percent above BAU.  
 
We can now address the effects of restricting the trade in carbon rights. When emissions 
trading under KyEv is restricted to 50 percent, the buyer regions USA and OHI significantly 
raise their carbon efficiency whereas the sellers Russia and EE as well as EUR reduce it. The 
logic behind this result is evident: Buyers have to switch to domestic action to fulfill their 
abatement obligations and therefore raise carbon-saving R&D. On the other hand, sellers now 
are confronted with a smaller market. This scale effect reduces their incentive to undertake 
R&D. However, in addition to this basic logic, there are secondary effects related to the level 
of global emissions. Since KyEv100 entails significant amounts of 'hot air', KyEv50 implies a 
smaller global carbon budget. This implies that the overall demand for carbon abatement 
rises. As a result, the seller region Japan (which is a seller from 2024 onwards) has an 
additional incentive to engage in carbon-saving R&D toward the end of the century, such that 
carbon efficiency under KyEv50 rises relative to KyEv100. 
 
In the non-Annex B regions KyEv50 goes along with lower carbon efficiency than KyEv100. 
This is again related to the lower level of global carbon emissions in the former scenario 
which implies that climate damage in non-Annex B regions is lower, both in terms of total as 
well as marginal damage. Since marginal avoided damage is the payoff from any dollar spent 
on carbon-saving R&D, the incentive to undertake these expenditures is reduced. 
 
In the KyDyn scenario the effects of trade restrictions are qualitatively similar to those under 
KyEv but less pronounced. The reason for this is that under full ET the potential for trade is 
smaller than under KyEv and so is the effect of restricting trade. In the seller regions EE, 
Japan and EUR KyDyn50 implies a smaller level of carbon efficiency than KyEv100, but the 
difference is very small towards the end of the century. The situation is similar for Russia, but 
towards the end of the century we even see higher carbon efficiency in the case of restricted 
trade. The explanation for these dynamics is that in KyDyn the overall abatement 
                                                                                                                                                          
19 Reduced damage also explains why R&D under KyEv100 is lower than under BAU in most non-Annex B 
  18requirements become increasingly aggressive over time. Therefore, restrictions to trade do 
reduce the size of the market on which permits can be sold, but the permits that can be sold 
become more and more valuable, implying an increasing incentive for carbon saving R&D on 
the part of the sellers. 
 
This logic is mirrored by the results for the buyer regions USA and OHI: While trade 
restrictions imply substantially higher carbon efficiency in the first half of the century, the 
effect becomes smaller in the second half. That is, as global carbon limits become stricter 
over time the sellers' comparative advantage gets accentuated when trade is restricted, and the 
buyers undertake less R&D. 
 
In the non-Annex B countries the effects of trade restrictions are mixed in sign but small in 
size. This is intuitively plausible: Since trade restrictions have less effect on the global carbon 
level under KyDyn than under KyEv (less 'hot air'), full trade and restricted trade differ little 
in terms of climate damage and, consequently, in terms of induced decarbonization. 
 
In the 500ppm case restrictions to emissions trading trigger very little deviations in terms of 
carbon efficiency from the case of unrestricted trade. The reason is that the trade volume is 
very small even in the unrestricted case since there is no 'hot air' and the profile of initial 
entitlements is already close to a least-cost allocation. 
                                                                                                                                                          
regions in the second half of the century. 
  19Table 4: Effects on Carbon Efficiency (average percentage change from BAU) 
KyEv100 KyEv50 KyDyn100 KyDyn50 500ppm100 500ppm50
EE 2014 0.59 -0.29 0.59 -0.43 0.58 -0.60
2024-2054 1.23 0.06 11.37 4.46 13.02 13.02
2064-2094 9.25 2.07 36.85 35.27 32.70 32.62
EUR 2014 0.33 1.79 0.03 1.79 -0.45 1.80
2024-2054 1.24 -0.47 12.58 4.96 14.23 14.14
2064-2094 0.32 0.05 35.38 32.82 31.39 31.55
Japan 2014 -0.12 3.63 -1.81 3.62 -1.81 3.62
2024-2054 2.60 -0.84 24.52 9.40 28.29 28.56
2064-2094 1.14 1.51 66.06 61.62 58.09 57.79
OHI 2014 -0.25 12.04 -0.41 12.09 -0.85 11.97
2024-2054 1.35 11.97 11.47 17.60 12.83 11.95
2064-2094 1.25 9.71 31.81 31.31 28.55 28.40
Russia 2014 2.29 1.26 2.29 1.13 2.31 0.42
2024-2054 0.69 -0.26 10.74 4.08 12.17 12.23
2064-2094 2.35 -1.28 31.72 37.33 28.35 36.18
USA 2014 -0.01 -0.14 -0.28 -0.29 -0.67 -0.73
2024-2054 1.28 16.52 11.14 19.64 12.76 12.41
2064-2094 0.80 17.94 28.81 30.23 25.92 25.99
Africa 2014 0.00 -0.05 -0.18 -0.20 -0.53 -0.37
2024-2054 -0.56 -0.62 -0.71 -0.76 5.06 5.70
2064-2094 -0.44 -0.75 -0.63 -0.87 8.44 8.43
China 2014 0.01 -0.15 -0.21 -0.29 -0.77 -0.80
2024-2054 -0.12 -0.27 -0.39 -0.47 10.39 10.47
2064-2094 -0.13 -0.28 -0.56 -0.63 24.14 23.98
HIO 2014 0.13 0.06 -0.49 -0.03 -0.35 -0.12
2024-2054 0.08 -0.25 0.01 -0.15 6.78 7.14
2064-2094 1.00 -0.24 -0.37 0.79 12.26 10.58
India 2014 -0.07 -0.16 -0.25 -0.29 -0.62 -0.69
2024-2054 0.12 0.03 -0.26 -0.11 7.66 7.74
2064-2094 -0.15 -0.28 -0.28 -0.54 16.46 16.64
LI 2014 0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.29 -0.30
2024-2054 0.18 0.04 -0.08 -0.12 6.80 6.97
2064-2094 -0.35 -0.30 -0.41 -0.50 14.21 14.06
LMI 2014 -0.02 -0.26 -0.26 -0.22 -0.49 -0.66
2024-2054 0.02 -0.10 -0.20 -0.27 8.61 8.77
2064-2094 -0.03 -0.14 -0.43 -0.43 18.80 18.81
MI 2014 -0.20 -0.30 -0.27 -0.42 -0.87 -0.80
2024-2054 0.04 -0.11 -0.26 -0.31 8.83 8.86





It remains to discuss the effects on consumption of our carbon abatement scenarios and of 
restrictions to emissions trading within these scenarios. These are presented in Table 5. On a 
world-wide scale we find that KyEv has practically no impact on consumption. This holds 
irrespective of the degree of emissions trading, which suggests that the economic costs of 
trade restrictions are just offset by the more pronounced reduction of climate damage when 
trade is restricted. 
  20Table 5: Effects on Consumption (average percentage change from BAU) 
KyEv100 KyEv50 KyDyn100 KyDyn50 500ppm100 500ppm50
EE 2014 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00
2024-2054 -0.002 0.023 -0.151 -0.071 -0.201 -0.207
2064-2094 -0.109 -0.027 -0.851 -0.772 -0.739 -0.805
EUR 2014 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2024-2054 0.000 0.005 -0.020 -0.008 -0.017 -0.015
2064-2094 0.011 0.042 -0.039 -0.031 0.055 0.070
Japan 2014 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
2024-2054 -0.001 0.001 -0.032 -0.020 -0.031 -0.031
2064-2094 0.007 0.013 -0.093 -0.089 -0.048 -0.053
OHI 2014 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03
2024-2054 -0.003 -0.041 -0.042 -0.064 -0.047 -0.051
2064-2094 -0.023 -0.062 -0.199 -0.205 -0.159 -0.156
Russia 2014 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02
2024-2054 -0.011 0.006 -0.196 -0.087 -0.279 -0.288
2064-2094 -0.077 0.020 -0.915 -0.882 -0.885 -0.793
USA 2014 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2024-2054 -0.005 -0.069 -0.058 -0.093 -0.052 -0.050
2064-2094 -0.003 -0.111 -0.262 -0.281 -0.161 -0.159
Africa 2014 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04
2024-2054 -0.002 0.006 0.004 0.009 -0.149 -0.139
2064-2094 0.082 0.123 0.151 0.171 -0.745 -0.736
China 2014 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
2024-2054 -0.003 -0.014 0.019 0.004 -0.407 -0.431
2064-2094 -0.043 -0.044 0.035 0.022 -1.399 -1.470
HIO 2014 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03
2024-2054 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.008 -0.081 -0.078
2064-2094 0.018 0.017 0.037 0.048 -0.482 -0.507
India 2014 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05
2024-2054 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.013 -0.220 -0.236
2064-2094 0.018 0.071 0.148 0.122 -1.032 -1.087
LI 2014 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05
2024-2054 0.021 0.029 0.026 0.032 -0.131 -0.136
2064-2094 -0.019 0.009 0.042 0.041 -0.820 -0.805
LMI 2014 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
2024-2054 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.008 -0.125 -0.125
2064-2094 0.006 0.036 0.054 0.056 -0.485 -0.491
MI 2014 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
2024-2054 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.049 -0.041
2064-2094 0.004 0.022 0.040 0.037 -0.251 -0.206
World 2014 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2024-2054 0.000 -0.014 -0.025 -0.026 -0.096 -0.097





In the KyDyn and 500ppm scenarios we find reductions of global consumption by up to 0.08 
and 0.44 percent, respectively. It is interesting to note that even in these cases the degree of 
admissible emissions trading has virtually no influence on global consumption. This may 
appear surprising since in these scenarios the global carbon trajectories differ less between the 
full ET and the restricted ET cases than under KyEv (less 'hot air'). This would then suggest 
that there is less scope for reduced climate damage to offset the 'excess costs' imposed by 
trade restrictions. But, on the other hand, there is also less potential for emissions trading in 
  21these scenarios than in the KyEv scenario, so restrictions to trade are less detrimental in terms 
of 'excess costs'. 
 
On a regional scale, effects on consumption do in some regions - but not all - depend on the 
admissible degree of ET. Under KyEv the permit seller regions Russia, EE, EUR, and Japan 
tend to benefit somewhat from trade restrictions while the permit buyers USA and OHI incur 
a loss. Thus, the enhanced decarbonization in permit buyer regions tends to be a poor 
substitute for the possibility to purchase carbon abatement from abroad. As concerns the non-
Annex B regions, most of them benefit from trade restrictions, due to reduced climate 
damage. Under KyDyn, trade restrictions have little impact on regional consumption. The 




This paper has examined the implications of restricting the tradability of carbon rights in the 
presence of induced technological change. Unlike earlier approaches aiming at exploring the 
tradability-technology linkage we have focused on climate-relevant 'carbon-saving' 
technological change. The following conclusions have emerged. 
•  Restricting the trade in carbon rights triggers additional investments in carbon saving 
technological progress in those regions that are buyers of carbon rights, while depressing 
these investments in seller regions. 
•  In scenarios involving 'hot air' regions that are not committed to carbon abatement will 
reduce their investment in carbon saving technological progress in response to trade 
restrictions due to the implied reduction in carbon damage. Feedback from the climate 
system is thus crucial for analyzing the effects of trade restrictions. 
•  The effect of trade restrictions on carbon saving technological progress depends on the 
scope for carbon trade inherent in each particular carbon abatement scenario. Scenarios 
involving 'hot air' entail comparatively stronger effects of trade restrictions on carbon 
saving technological progress. Likewise, scenarios in which the initial allocation of 
carbon rights differs much from the least-cost allocation also entail a stronger effect. 
•  If global carbon restrictions become stricter over time, the incentives for sellers of carbon 
rights to undertake carbon saving investments may rise as emissions trading gets 
restricted, the reason being that permits to be sold become more valuable as abatement 
requirements are tightened. 
  22•  In terms of consumption, restrictions to emissions trading have only small effects. 
Qualitatively, buyers of carbon permits tend to be negatively affected by trade restrictions. 
Sellers of carbon permits benefit from trade restrictions. Regions that are not committed to 
carbon abatement may benefit from trade restrictions to the extent that global carbon 
levels and the ensuing climate damage get reduced. 
Overall, it may be concluded that the debate on whether or not to restrict the trade in carbon 
permits in the presence of induced carbon saving technological progress is difficult to settle 
on efficiency grounds. Trade restrictions mainly induce a reallocation of R&D efforts among 
buyers and sellers and a small shift of welfare from the former to the latter, but the worldwide 
welfare effects are almost invisible. Thus, the issue seems to be largely of a distributional or 
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  25Appendix 1: Description of RICE / DICE models 
 
The RICE (Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy) model family analyzes 
the interactions between climate and the economy. Being growth models as well as integrated 
assessment models, they analyze the welfare effects of climate policy in the framework of 
intertemporal utility maximization. The first aggregated version (DICE, Dynamic Integrated 
model of Climate and the Economy) was described in Nordhaus (1994) and later followed by 
the regionalized version of Nordhaus and Young (1996). A major revision of the models that 
encompasses updates of data as well as methodological changes has been made at the end of 
the nineties by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). These updated models are known as RICE/DICE-
99 and are available at www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/homepage.htm in the form 
of GAMS and Excel files.  
 
RICE is a growth model. According to neoclassical growth theory of the Ramsey-type, a 
representative agent maximizes intertemporal utility. The decision either to consume or to 
invest determines the development of the capital stock. This, in turn, determines consumption 
possibilities in later periods. Therefore, there is a trade-off between lower consumption (and 
higher investment) today and higher consumption possibilities in the future. Furthermore, the 
world in RICE-99 is divided into 13 (world-) regions that can be grouped into trading blocs 
for ET. 
 
RICE is also an integrated assessment model that takes into account the (mostly negative) 
feedbacks of carbon emissions on the economy. Anthropogenic emissions that result from 
production feed into a climate module of the model. In the climate module, rising carbon 
concentrations lead to rising temperatures that result in different feedbacks on the outputs of 
the different regions. Since the (time-lagged) feedbacks on production are mostly negative, 
there is a second trade-off between consumption possibilities today and tomorrow. Lower 
production today means lower associated emissions. These cause lower negative feedbacks 
and therefore higher production possibilities in later periods. Anthropogenic GHG emissions 
become an additional factor that enters intertemporal utility maximization. 
  26Appendix 2: Derivation of Energy Capital R&D-Stocks 
 
Table - A 1 shows R&D energy capital stocks for the world regions of RICE-99. The 
procedure is as follows: From an IEA-database
20 (IEA (1997, showing annual governmental 
R&D budgets on energy capital from 1974 – 2000), all annual fossil fuel related R&D 
budgets have been aggregated until 1994. These aggregated, annual government R&D 
budgets have been scaled up using figures on the percentage of government shares on gross 
domestic R&D expenditures (OECD (1987 - 1998). Missing data has been interpolated. 
According to the perpetual inventory model in equation (7), these yearly investments build up 
the capital stock using a depreciation rate of 5%. Due to the long period of twenty years, no 
initial capital stock is applied. The resulting national capital stocks for 1994 (the benchmark 
year) are aggregated according to the world regions in RICE-99. However, these data are only 
available for OECD countries, that is, they apply only to the RICE-99 regions Japan, OECD 
Europe, OHI and USA. For the remaining regions, the R&D energy capital stocks are inferred 
by the method proposed by Buonanno et al. (2001): the ratio of the R&D capital stocks and 
physical capital stocks of these four regions is used to infer the missing R&D energy capital 
stocks for the other regions. 
 
Table - A 1: R&D Stocks of Energy Knowledge 
World Regions 
 
R&D Energy Capital Stock 1994
(bill 1990 US$)
Annex B 
EE (Eastern Europe)  1,288
EUR (OECD Europe)  11,076
Japan 25,986






HIO (High Income OPEC)  1,298
India  0,975
LI (Low Income Countries)  1,500
LMI (Lower & Middle Income Countries)  3,561
Middle Income Countries (MI)  4,239
Source: IEA 1997; own calculations 
                                                 
20 See also: www.iea.org/stats/files/rd.htm  
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